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Terrorism offences in Belgian criminal law: is less more? 
Ward Yperman* 
Abstract EU Directive 2017/541 of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism requires 
member states to criminalize certain conduct. Belgium implemented the Directive by creating 
several terrorist offences, which resemble the wording of the Directive. However, some of these 
offences are beyond the scope of the Directive. Since the Directive already is quite broad and 
vague, this means the Belgian offences are even broader and sometimes also vaguer. This 
paper gives a detailed description of the existing Belgian terrorism offences, pointing out issues 
of broadness and vagueness, as well as overlap between the different offences. This ambiguity 
seems to be at odds with the legality principle which requires clear and well-defined offences. 
The paper concludes that Belgium should have implemented the wording of the Directive more 
precisely. The EU in turn could review the necessity and wording of the different terrorism 
offences in the Directive. Having fewer offences which are crafted more precisely would 
already go a long way in solving the ambiguity of these offences. 
Introduction 
Terrorism has in recent years been a very prominent issue in many states, leading them 
to expand their counterterrorism arsenal. This happened under the impulse of actors such as 
the European Union, the Council of Europe and the United Nations.1 One part of the 
counterterrorism approach has been the creation of terrorism offences. For the EU, this part 
evolved in three stages. In 2002 the Council of the EU adopted the Framework Decision on 
combatting terrorism.2 Six years later this Framework Decision was amended by another one.3 
Finally, in 2017, the Directive on combatting terrorism (hereafter ‘the Directive’) was adopted, 
replacing the Framework Decision.4 
 
* PhD researcher and teaching assistant, Institute for Criminal Law, KU Leuven. 
1 E.g.: Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Warsaw, 16 May 2005; UNSC Resolution 
2178, 24 September 2014, 6(a), <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2178> (accessed 12 June 2020). See also: Jan 
Velaers, ‘La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme et Les Droits de l’homme: Dévelopements Récents En Belgique’ in P 
D’Argent, D Renders and M Verdussen (eds), Les Visages de L’Etat, Liber Amicorum Yves Lejeune (Bruylant 
2017) 775. 
2 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism [2002] OJ L164/5. 
3 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism [2008] OJ L330/21. 
4 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA [2017] OJ L88/6. 
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Different member states have implemented these international instruments in different 
ways. This paper focuses on Belgian law, which has a tradition of responding to issues by using 
the criminal justice system rather than other branches of law such as administrative law. The 
aforementioned EU instruments are the international instruments which influenced Belgian law 
the most. In 2003, in response to the original 2002 EU Framework Decision, the Belgian 
legislature introduced the first Belgian terrorism offences.5 Before 2003, there were no specific 
terrorist offences in Belgian criminal law and terrorism suspects were prosecuted under other 
‘ordinary’ offences.6  Most of the other Belgian terrorist offences were introduced in 2013, in 
response to the second EU Framework Decision (and the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism).7 The most recent amendment to the Belgian terrorism offences was 
made in 2019 in response to the EU Directive.8 This paper will often refer back to these EU 
instruments, and more specifically to the Directive, since this is the instrument currently in 
force.  
The EU instruments provide for minimum harmonization, which means they require 
member states to criminalize certain conduct but allow states to go further if desired.9 The 
Belgian legislature chose to expand some of the terrorism offences beyond the scope of the EU 
instruments, but overall, it adhered quite closely to the wording of the EU instruments. Because 
of this, comments on the Belgian offences may prove valuable to the criminal justice systems 
of other European states, whose legislation is also based on those same instruments. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the Belgian legislation can also serve to highlight issues with the 
EU Directive itself.  
 
5 Anne Weyembergh and Laurent Kennes, ‘Le Titre Iter Du Livre II Du Code Pénal: Des Infractions Terroristes’, 
Droit pénal spécial: tome 1 (Anthémis 2011) 102. 
6 I De La Serna, ‘Des Infractions Terroristes’, Les Infractions (Larcier 2013) 170 and 173; Adrien Masset, 
‘Terrorisme’ [2013] Postal Memorialis - Lexicon strafrecht, strafvordering en bijzondere wetten 411, T60/8-
T60/11; Martin Moucheron, ‘Délit politique et terrorisme en Belgique : du noble au vil’ [2006] Cultures & conflits 
77, paras 1 and 15; Anne Weyembergh and Laurent Kennes, ‘Domestic Provisions and Case Law: The Belgian 
Case’ in Francesca Galli and Anne Weyembergh (eds), EU counter-terrorism offences: What impact on national 
elgislation and case-law? (Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles 2012) 150; Weyembergh and Kennes (n 5) 103–
104; Alain Winants, ‘De invloed van terrorisme op de strafwetgeving: actualia materieel strafrecht’ (2019) 14 
Nullum Crimen 343, 345. 
7 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 tot wijziging van Titel 1ter van het Strafwetboek, Parl. St. Kamer 
2012-2013, nr. 53-2502/001, (4) 4. The final two terrorism offences were introduced in 2015 (the traveling 
offence) and 2016 (the preparation offence). The former was the result of UNSC Resolution 2178 (see footnote 
1) and is now also part of the EU Directive. The latter was introduced by the Belgian legislature without any 
international obligations to do so. 
8 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 houdende diverse bepalingen in strafzaken en inzake 
erediensten, Parl.St. Kamer 2018-2019, nr. 54-3515/001, 99. 
9 Art 1 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
152 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
This paper starts by giving an overview of all terrorist offences in Belgian criminal law. 
This includes terrorist attacks10, or terrorism stricto sensu, but also terrorism lato sensu11. These 
terrorist offences lato sensu are aimed at people who prepare or facilitate terrorist attacks 
through involvement in the activities of a terrorist group, provocation to commit terrorism, 
recruitment for terrorism, providing or receiving training for terrorism (including self-study), 
terrorist travel, preparing a terrorist attack or financing a terrorist. After an analysis of these 
offences, a final section of the paper highlights their broadness and vagueness, which leads to 
significant overlap between the offences. This broadness and vagueness seem to be at odds 
with the legality principle12 which requires clear and well-defined offences. Since the Belgian 
offences are sometimes broader than the ones in the Directive, Belgium could have reduced 
the broadness and vagueness of its offences by implement the wording of the Directive more 
precisely. The EU in turn could review the necessity and wording of the different terrorism 
offences in the Directive. Having less offences which are crafted more precisely would already 
go a long way in solving the ambiguity of these offences. 
1. Terrorist offences in Belgian criminal law 
1.1 Terrorist attacks 
1.1.1 Actus reus 
First, we turn to what the Directive calls ‘terrorist offences’, meaning the actual acts of 
terrorism, also known as terrorism stricto sensu. This offence was part of the original 
Framework Decision and was introduced into Belgian criminal law in 2003. The Belgian 
legislature adhered closely to the wording of the European instruments when transposing this 
offence into Belgian law. It is the core of the terrorism offences, since the mens rea of all of 
the terrorism offences lato sensu refers (sometimes in combination with other terrorist offences 
lato sensu) to terrorism stricto sensu (see below). Due to this, any broadness or uncertainty 
 
10 E.g. terrorist murder, terrorist arson, etc. For a more elaborate explanation, see below. 
11 Being all other offences related in some way to terrorism although not covered by the offence of terrorism 
stricto sensu. 
12 This principle includes the principle of non-retrospectivity, the principle of law making by parliament according 
to pre-prescribed rules and the principle of clarity and foreseeability of the law. Especially clarity and 
foreseeability are essential in this context. These underlying principles can be distilled from the literature and 
roughly encompass the 8 ‘Fuller criteria’: L Besselink, F Pennings and S Prechal, ‘Introduction: legality in 
multiple legal orders’ in L Besselink, F Pennings and S Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the 
European Union (Kluwer 2011) 6-7; U De Vries and L Francot-Timmermans, ‘As Good as It Gets: On Risk, 
Legality and the Precautionary Principle’ in L Besselink, F Pennings and S Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of the 
Legality Principle in the European Union (Kluwer 2011) 26 and 30; G. Hallevy, A Modern Treatise on the 
Principle of Legality in Criminal Law (Springer 2010), 6-7. 
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regarding the scope of terrorism stricto sensu has a direct effect on the broadness and vagueness 
of all the other terrorism offences. 
The actus reus of terrorism stricto sensu in Belgium consists of two lists.13 Article 137, 
§2 of the Belgian Criminal Code14 (hereafter CC) contains the first list. This list consists of 
criminal offences that are also punishable under Belgian law outside of the context of terrorism, 
for example murder or hostage taking.15 Article 137, §3 CC contains the second list, which 
consists of acts that do not constitute criminal offences outside of a terrorism context, for 
example hijacking a vehicle other than an aircraft or a ship (hijacking those is a pre-existing 
offence featured in §2), or threatening to commit terrorism stricto sensu.16  
After its introduction into the CC in 2003, Article 137 was amended three times, each 
time introducing new possible terrorist offences to the aforementioned lists. Firstly, in 2009 
piracy was added to the list of §2 of potential terrorist offences.17 Secondly, in 2013 the 
legislature changed the reference to the arms legislation (which had been replaced in 2006)18 
and added a §2, 11°, which adds to the list attempts of the standard offences on that list.19 
Thirdly, the statute of the 5th of May 2019 introduced a new §2, 4°/1, which adds the unlawful 
disturbance of (data in) an IT-system20 to the list of possible terrorist offences. The same statute 
also expanded §3, 3° to radiological weapons.21 The addition of attempted standard offences 
 
13 Weyembergh and Kennes (n 6) 152. 
14 Strafwetboek van 8 juni BS 9 juni 1867, 3133. 
15 Véronique Hameeuw, ‘Strafbaarstelling van terroristische misdrijven: van Europees Kaderbesluit tot het 
Belgische Strafwetboek’ [2005] Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 2, 5; Winants (n 6) 347. 
16 Elise Delhaise, Infractions terroristes (Larcier 2019) 30; I De La Serna (n 6) 167 and 180; Ignacio De La Serna, 
‘Des infractions terroristes’ in Christian De Valkeneer and Ignacio De La Serna, À la découverte de la justice 
pénale: Paroles de juriste (Larcier 2015) 207; Alain De Nauw and Franklin Kuty, Manuel de Droit Pénal Spécial 
(Wolters Kluwer 2014) 17; Johan Delmulle and Stefaan Guenter, ‘Gerechtelijke Aanpak Inzake Terrorisme’, 
Strafrecht en Strafprocesrecht (Wolters Kluwer 2006) 4; An Fransen and Jan Kerkhofs, ‘Het Materieel 
Terrorismestrafrecht’ in Jan Kerkhofs, Antoon Schotsaert and Philippe Van Linthout (eds), Contra-terrorisme: 
De gerechtelijke aanpak van terrorisme in België (Larcier 2018) 19–20; Masset (n 6) T60/18.; A De Nauw, ‘Titel 
Iter: Terroristische misdrijven’ in A De Nauw (ed), Inleiding tot het bijzonder strafrecht (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 
(7) 7; Hameeuw (n 15) 5-6; Winants (n 6) 347. 
17 Art 7 wet van 30 december 2009 betreffende de strijd tegen piraterij op zee, BS 14 januari 2010, 1485. 
18 The ‘wet van 8 juni 2006 houdende regeling van economische en individuele activiteiten met wapens’ replaced 
the ‘wet van 3 januari 1933 op de vervaardiging van, de handel in en het dragen van wapens en op de handel in 
munitie, gewijzigd bij de wetten van 30 januari en 5 augustus 1991, 9 maart 1995, 24 juni 1996, 18 juli 1997, 
10 januari 1999 en 30 maart 2000’. 
19 Art 2 wet van 18 februari 2013 tot wijziging van boek II, titel Iter van het Strafwetboek, BS 4 maart 2013, 
13233. Article 3 of this statute amended Article 138 CC to set the sentence for these attempted standard offences. 
See also: Delhaise (n 16) 81; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 19. 
20 Art 550ter, §1-3 CC. 
21 Art 74 wet van 5 mei 2019 houdende diverse bepalingen in strafzaken en inzake erediensten, en tot wijziging 
van de wet van 28 mei 2002 betreffende de euthanasie en van het Sociaal Strafwetboek (1), BS 24 mei 2019, 
50023. See also: Stéphanie De Coensel, ‘De Wet Diverse Bepalingen in Strafzaken II: Terroristische misdrijven 
in lijn met de Europese verplichtingen?’ (2019) 40 Panopticon 211, 212; Winants (n 6) 357. 
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in 2013 is significant because, in Belgium, attempted standard offences are only punishable 
when the law explicitly states this (contrary to attempted felonies, which are always 
punishable).22 Consequently, certain attempted terrorist standard offences were not punishable, 
despite this being one of the obligations of the Directive.23  
Almost all of the acts listed require human lives to be endangered. However, for 
offences entailing large-scale destruction or damage, causing significant economic damage is 
sufficient.24 Clearly, it is difficult to draw the line between terrorism and other offences. Some 
academics have stated that offences which do not constitute violence against people or at least 
the threat thereof, should not be labelled terrorism.25 Indeed, the label ‘terrorist’ can have far-
reaching consequences, both within criminal law and criminal procedure26 and outside of it27. 
Despite these concerns, the requirement that significant economic damage is caused, still 
suffices as it can impact the stability of a nation and indirectly endanger human lives. However, 
this is not clear in the wording of Article 137 CC despite the Belgian Constitutional Court not 
finding it to be in violation of the principle of legality.28 A better alternative to ‘substantial 
damage’ would have been something similar to ‘damage that could endanger the stability of 
the country and the security of its citizens’.  
 
22 Art 53 CC; De La Serna (n 6) 207; Delhaise (n 16) 81; A De Nauw and F Deruyck, Overzicht van het Belgisch 
algemeen strafrecht (Die Keure / la Charte 2017) 51; Chris Van den Wyngaert and Steven Vandromme, Strafrecht 
en strafprocesrecht in hoofdlijnen (Maklu 2014) 356. 
23 Art 14.3 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). Originally art 4.2 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (n 2). 
See also: MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 10; Weyembergh and Kennes (n 6) 156; Winants (n 
6) 350. 
24 Art 137, §2, 4° CC; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 19. 
25 B Ganor, ‘Defining terrorism: is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?’ [2002] Police Practice and 
Research (287) 294; B Hoffman, Inside terrorism, revised and expanded edition (Columbia University Press 
2006) 40-41; R Jackson, ‘In defence of “terrorism”: finding a way through a forest of misconceptions’ (2011) 3 
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression (116) 123; J Lutz and B Lutz, Global Terrorism 
(Routledge 2013) 8-9; A Richards, ‘Conceptualizing Terrorism’ [2014] Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (213) 
230. 
26 Aggravated sentences, but also procedural exceptions. For an overview and analysis of some of these procedural 
consequences, see (in Dutch and French): Noémie Blaise and Elise Delhaise, ‘La répression des voyages à visée 
terroriste à l’aune des droits fondamentaux’ [2019] Journal Tribunaux 173; Masset (n 6) T60/20-T60/22; Jan 
Roelandt, ‘De strijd tegen het terrorisme: een overzicht van de recente wetgevende ingrepen in het 
straf(proces)recht’ [2017] Nullum Crimen 10; Ward Yperman, ‘De bestrijding van terrorisme en strafprocesrecht: 
vele kleintjes maken een grote’ [2019] Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 8. 
27 W Mucha, ‘Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France 
and Germany’ (2017) 10 Journal for deradicalization 230 – 254; G Mythen, S Walklate and F Khan, ‘”Why Should 
We Have to Prove We’re Alright?”: Counter-terrorism, Risk and Partial Securities’, (2012) 2 Sociology 383-398; 
S Samuel Justin and A Daniel, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears (Oxford University Press 2012) 14; V Tadros, 
‘Justice and Terrorism’, [2007] New Criminal Law Review (658) 685.  
28 See below: Part 2. Broadness, vagueness and overlap. 
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Delhaise in turn points out that many sexual offences are not on the list, despite the fact 
that these offences, especially when committed in a systematic manner and on a large scale, 
are used as a weapon by terrorist organizations.29 
Article 137 CC also requires that the offence may, given its nature or context, seriously 
damage a country or an international organization. Belgian legal theory calls this the 
‘contextual element’ of the offence.30 This requirement was copied from European 
instruments.31 The damage does not need to have set in already, the possibility for damage is 
sufficient.32 This ‘contextual element’ takes into account not just the nature of the offence, but 
also its wider consequences for the organization and government of a country.33 However, 
viewing contextual information as a separate element is unnecessary. Taking into account 
contextual information (legal facts) when defining an offence is something that happens 
regularly. For example for the offence of raping a person of less than fourteen years old34, the 
age of the victim is part of the actus reus of the offence35 and for bankruptcy offences36, the 
fact that the company is bankrupt is part of the actus reus as well. Legal facts such as these are 
part of the actus reus of those offences, as is the case for terrorism stricto sensu. 
1.1.2 Mens Rea 
The required mens rea is a form of special intent.37 The offence needs to be committed 
‘with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or 
international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
 
29 Delhaise (n 16) 30. Note that this is mainly the case in quasi-war situations outside of Europe (for example in 
the Middle East or Africa). It seems that the definition is mainly shaped by the type of terrorism that we have 
experienced in Europe so far. 
30  De La Serna, 2013 (n 11) 177; De La Serna, 2015 (n 11) 204–205; Delhaise (n 11) 28–29; Fransen and Kerkhofs 
(n 11) 21; Winants (n 10) 347. Hameeuw states that the wording of what others call the contextual element is so 
broad that it cannot constitute a part of an offence. However, Hameeuw seems to be the only one in the literature 
taking this stance. See: Hameeuw (n 10) 6. 
31 Art 3(1) Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). Originally art 1.1 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (n 2). 
See also: Masset (n6) T60/18. Note that according to Borgers, member states were not obliged to actually include 
this in their definition. See: Matthias Borgers, ‘Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism: Two Questions on 
the Definition of Terrorist Offences’’ (2012) 3 New J Eur Crim L 68. 
32 Delhaise (n 16) 33; Ann Fransen and Jan Kerkhofs, ‘Het Materieel Terrorismestrafrecht in België: De 
Misdrijven’ (2018) 3 Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 150, 21; Hameeuw (n 15) 6. 
33 Verslag namens de commissie van justitie bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 betreffende terroristische 
misdrijven, Parl.St. Kamer 2003, nr. 51-0258/004, 14; De La Serna (n 16) 204–205; Delmulle and Guenter (n 16) 
3; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 32) 21. 
34 Art 375, section 6 CC. 
35 Cass. 10 maart 1930, Pas 1930, I, 156; De Nauw and Kuty (n 16) 229; Gaëlle Marlier, Familie in het straf- en 
strafprocesrecht: afbrokkelende hoeksteen van de samenleving? (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 299. 
36 Art 489-489sexies CC. 
37 De La Serna (n 6) 179; De La Serna (n 16) 207; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 20; Hameeuw (n 15) 5; Winants 
(n 6) 347. 
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destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organization’.38 This phrasing is copied from the 
original Framework Decision and is still part of the Directive.39 The three options are not 
cumulative and a political, religious or philosophical motive is not required.40 The words 
‘international organization’ only refer to international organizations under public international 
law and not to NGOs for example.41 Legal theory states that the words ‘a population’ can refer 
to a nation’s whole population, but to the populations of smaller areas such as a specific region 
or city as well.42 It does imply that the aim of intimidating a single person or very small group 
of people does not suffice.43 ‘Government’, finally, not only refers to the Belgian government, 
but to any government, regardless of its democratic character.44 
 The mens rea of terrorism stricto sensu is quite broad and vague. For example, 
the ‘aim of seriously intimidating a population’ suffices and no further goal is required. While 
acts of terrorism often instrumentalize fear and aim to achieve their end goals through 
intimidating the population45, intimidation is rarely the end goal in itself. Furthermore, 
terminology such as ‘seriously intimidating’, ‘unduly compelling’, ‘seriously destabilizing’ has 
an inherent vagueness about it. The broadness and vagueness of the mens rea is especially 
relevant because all of the terrorism offences lato sensu, which are discussed below, have a 
‘two stage’ mens rea: their mens rea refers to terrorism stricto sensu.46 Therefore, any 
broadness or vagueness in the offence of terrorism stricto sensu, has an effect on the scope and 
delineation of all terrorist offences. Since the mens rea is a literal copy of the European 
instruments, it is up to the EU level to evaluate whether such broadness and vagueness is 
desired. 
 
38 Art 137, §1 CC. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. See also: Delhaise (n 16) 31–33; Masset (n 6) 
T60/18; Winants (n 6) 347. 
39 Art 3.2 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). Originally art 1.1 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (n 2). 
See also: Hameeuw (n 15) 5; Weyembergh and Kennes (n 6) 153. 
40 Delhaise (n 16) 31; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 20.; Hameeuw (n 15) 6. 
41 Verslag namens de commissie van justitie bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 33) 14; De La Serna (n 6) 
178; De La Serna (n 16) 206; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 21; Masset (n 6) T60/18. 
42 De La Serna (n 6) 178; De La Serna (n 16) 206; Delhaise (n 16) 32; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 20. Hameeuw 
wonders where to draw the line though. When is a group of people too small to be a population? See: Hameeuw 
(n 15) 6. 
43 De La Serna (n 6) 178. 
44 See the GICM case: Corr. Brussel 16 Februari 2006; Brussel 19 januari 2007, Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 2008, 
281, noot F Schuermans. See as well: De La Serna, 2015 (n 16) 198–199; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 39; 
Weyembergh and Kennes (n 6) 159–160. 
45 See for example: Hoffman (n 25) 40-41 ; Jackson (n 25) 123; Richards, (n 25) 230. 
46 In addition, it sometimes refers to other terrorism offences lato sensu as well. 
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1.2 Offences related to terrorist groups 
1.2.1 Terrorist groups 
Article 140 CC contains three offences, all three of which criminalize conduct related 
to terrorist groups. An important question for these three offences is therefore when will a 
group of people become a terrorist group. Article 139 CC defines a terrorist group as ‘any 
structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in 
concert to commit terrorist offences, as meant in Article 137’.47 The preparatory works further 
explain that a structured group is one that ‘is not randomly formed and that does not need to 
have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed 
structure’.48 Both these definitions are almost literal copies of an article of the Framework 
Decision, now Directive.49  
While ‘acting in concert’ suggests a form of mutual deliberation and coherence of 
actions,50 the extent of collaboration required is uncertain. For example, not all members must 
to be informed about each other’s actions or even know each other, as long as they all contribute 
to the existence of the group.51 Nor does contact need to be in person, but can also be over the 
internet or by other means of correspondence.52  
The legislature treats a terrorist group as a separate entity with its own intent, as an 
‘illegal entity’53. The goal of the entity must be the perpetration of terrorist offences stricto 
sensu. To be able to judge the goal of a certain group mainly operating in for example Syria or 
Iraq, sometimes a good amount of geopolitical knowledge is required.54 The situation on the 
ground can be chaotic and allegiances are not always clear, nor are the aims and origins of 
every group which is active in such areas. Furthermore, the fact that a group is part of a 
 
47 Art 139, section 1 CC. Own translation, original in Dutch and French.  
48 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 betreffende terroristische misdrijven, Parl.St. Kamer 2003, nr. 51-
0258/001, (4) 12. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. See also: Delhaise (n 16) 36–37; Hameeuw (n 
15) 8; Winants (n 6) 347–348. 
49 Art 2 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (n 2). Now art 2.3 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). See also: 
De La Serna (n 6) 181–182; Delhaise (n 16) 35; Weyembergh and Kennes (n 6) 153. 
50 De La Serna (n 16) 211; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 28; Winants (n 6) 348. 
51 De La Serna (n 6) 183; De La Serna (n 16) 209–211. 
52 De La Serna (n 6) 183. 
53 In Dutch: ‘strafrechtspersoon’. This term was coined by Verbruggen, in the context of criminal organizations 
(see: Frank Verbruggen , ‘Schaduwboksen in het donker: de dogmatische onderbouw van het strafrechtelijk 
overheidsoptreden tegen georganiseerde criminaliteit’ (PhD Thesis KULeuven, 2001) 195). Criminal 
organizations have a similar definition to terrorist groups (see: advies 34.362/4 van de Raad van State bij 
wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 betreffende terroristische misdrijven, Parl.St. Kamer 2003, nr. 51-0258/001, (22) 
33. See also: De La Serna (n 6) 182; Verbruggen 302–303). 
54 De La Serna (n 6) 184 and 201. 
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European or international list of terrorist organizations, does not automatically mean it qualifies 
as a terrorist group under Article 139 CC or vice versa.55 While the goal of the group must be 
the perpetration of terrorism stricto sensu, it is not required that these offences have actually 
been committed, or even been prepared already.56 However, how do you prove that the intent 
of the illegal entity is the perpetration of a terrorist attack if the preparations for the attack have 
not even started yet? The danger of a broad interpretation arises where groups are labelled 
terrorist based on vague notions that they might intend to perpetrate a terrorist attack. Given 
that different types of involvement in the group constitute terrorist offences (see below), this 
vague definition of a terrorist group can raise legality issues. 
1.2.2 Participating in the activities of a terrorist group 
Actus Reus 
The terrorist offence for which by far the most prosecutions are brought is participating 
in the activities of a terrorist group (art. 140, §1 CC).57 This article was also introduced in 
200358 in response to the 2002 Framework Decision59. The actus reus is the participation in 
any activity of a terrorist group. The Criminal Code, echoing the Directive, explicitly adds to 
this ‘be it by providing data or material resources to a terrorist group or any form of financing 
of any activity of a terrorist group’.60 However, this enumeration of actions is not exhaustive.61 
According to Belgian case law, actions such as providing moral support, can constitute 
participation in the activities of a terrorist group.62 Furthermore, the contribution to the 
activities of the group does not need to be systematic, an occasional contribution suffices.63 
 
55 ibid 186–187; De La Serna (n 16) 214; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 29. The council chamber and indictment 
chamber in Brussels for example ruled that the PKK was not a terrorist organization, even though it is on the EU 
list of terrorist organization. See: KI Brussel 14 september 2017, Rechtskundig Weekblad 2017-18, 1611, noot J 
Wouters en T Van Poecke; KI Brussel 8 maart 2019, 44; RK Brussel 3 november 2016, 11; Jan Wouters and 
Thomas Van Poecke, ‘Van Strijdkrachten, Terroristen En Het Belgisch Strafrecht (Noot Onder KI Brussel 14 
September 2017)’ [2017–2018] Rechtskundig Weekblad 1616. 
56 De La Serna (n 6) 186; De La Serna (n 16) 212–213; Delhaise (n 16) 38; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 29; 
Hameeuw (n 15) 8; Winants (n 6) 348. 
57 Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 16; Winants (n 6) 349. 
58 Art 6 wet van 19 december 2003 betreffende terroristische misdrijven, BS 29 december 2003, 61689. 
59 Art 2 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (n 2). Now art 4 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
60 Art 140, §1 CC. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. 
61 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 13; Corr. Brussel 3 mei 2016, 35; De La Serna (n 6) 191. 
62 Brussel 2 juni 2017, 22; Corr. Brussel 3 mei 2016, 36; Corr. Brussel 8 mei 2017, 5; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 
16) 32; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 32) 159; Ward Yperman and Sofie Royer, ‘Veroordeling Jihadibruid’ [2017] 
Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 813. 
63 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 13; De La Serna (n 6) 191; De La Serna (n 16) 219; Delhaise 
(n 16) 40; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 30; Hameeuw (n 15) 9. 
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The case law has given a broad interpretation of participation in any activity of a 
terrorist group despite Article 140, §1 CC requiring a concrete act of participation. This 
interpretation includes following military training with a terrorist group64, or fighting for a 
terrorist group in a war zone65, but also sending a package of (civilian) clothes to a family 
member who is a member of a terrorist group66, cooking or being a driver for the group67, 
mentally encouraging fighters of the group by sending them messages from their families or 
promising them to join them68 and marrying and having a sexual relationship with a fighter of 
the group69. This very wide interpretation results in Article 140, §1 CC having a very wide 
potential scope of application. One would thus expect the mens rea to narrow down the scope 
of application of the article.70 
Mens Rea 
This mens rea is: ‘he knew or should have known that his participation could contribute 
to the committal of a felony or standard offence by the terrorist group’.71 This felony or 
standard offence does not necessarily have to be a terrorist offence, any felony or standard 
offence suffices.72 Nor does the connection to the committal of the offence by the group have 
to be a direct one.73 The person also does not have to have the intention of committing this 
offence himself.74 Committing offences is the intention of the illegal entity but not necessarily 
of the individual people participating in its activities.  
Following the introduction of the Article 140 in 2003, the mens rea was ‘he knows that 
his participation contributes to the committal of a felony or standard offence by the terrorist 
 
64 Brussel 28 mei 2015, 29. 
65 Corr. Brussel 3 mei 2016, 52. 
66 Corr. Brussel 14 mei 2014. 
67 Corr. Antwerpen (afd. Antwerpen) 11 februari 2015, 50; Corr. Antwerpen 30 maart 2015, 4; Corr. Antwerpen 
(afd. Antwerpen) 25 januari 2016, 3. 
68 Corr. Brussel 3 mei 2016, 38-39. 
69 Corr. Oost-Vlaanderen (afd. Gent) 16 oktober 2017, Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 2017, 805, noot W Yperman 
en S Royer. 
70 Stéphanie De Coensel, ‘Counter-Terrorism & Criminal Law: A Normative Legitimacy Test of Terrorism-
Related Offences on Expression, Information and Movement’ (PhD Thesis, University of Ghent 2020) 271. 
71 Art 140, §1 CC. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. 
72 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 13; De La Serna (n 6) 189; De La Serna (n 16) 216; Fransen 
and Kerkhofs (n 16) 30; Hameeuw (n 15) 9; Winants (n 6) 348. 
73 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 13; Delhaise (n 16) 40–41; Delmulle and Guenter (n 16) 4; 
Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 30. 
74 De La Serna (n 6) 189; Delhaise (n 16) 42–43. 
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group’.75 This was copied from the Framework Decision and the Directive is still worded 
similarly.76 In December 2016, however, the Belgian legislature chose to be more restrictive 
and changed the wording to the current one.77 This is remarkable since at the introduction of 
the article in 2003, the explanatory memorandum stated that knowing that a person contributes 
to the committal of felonies and standard offences by the terrorist group was the decisive 
criterion.78 The change was made with the Dutch concept of ‘mogelijkheidsbewustzijn’79 in 
mind.80 ‘Mogelijkheidsbewustzijn’ is present when somebody intentionally acts or fails to act, 
while knowing a consequence (which he does not intend) is possible, but he does not let this 
possibility stop him. He accepts the possible consequences.81 This closely resembles the 
Belgian concept of potential intent.82 
This standard is more flexible than Belgian general intent (‘knowingly and willingly’) 
in two ways. First, the knowledge element (‘knowingly’) is relaxed to knowledge of the 
possibility of consequences instead of certainty. Second, the will element (‘willingly’) is 
relaxed to accepting the consequences instead of actually wanting them.83 If we look at both 
changes to the mens rea separately, we see that the second change (‘could contribute’) is indeed 
a part of ‘mogelijkheidsbewustzijn’/potential intent: the knowledge element is being relaxed to 
knowledge of the possibility. The first change (‘should have known’), by contrast, is a 
 
75 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 13. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. See also: 
Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 28; Winants (n 6) 348. 
76 Art 4 (b) Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
77 Art 2 wet van 14 december 2016 tot wijziging van het Strafwetboek wat betreft de bestraffing van terrorisme, 
BS 22 december 2016, 88017. 
78 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 7; Weyembergh and Kennes (n 6) 154; Winants (n 6) 348. 
79 Which literally translates to opportunity awareness. Another term for it can be translated as ‘conditional intent’.  
80 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 tot wijziging van het Strafwetboek wat betreft de bestraffing 
van terrorisme, Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1579/001, 3; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 35; Winants (n 6) 355. 
81 Conclusie A-G Berger bij Hoge Raad 30 mei 1975, ECLI:NL:PHR:1975:AC5594 (bierglasarrest). See also: 
Gerechtshof Den Haag 27 oktober 2016, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2016:3699; AC ’T Hart, noot onder Hoge Raad 15 
oktober 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZD0139; AJ Machielsen, ‘Materiële verweren’, in MF Attinger et al (eds), 
Handboek Strafzaken (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 36.1.1.1. 
82 Lieven Dupont, Beginselen van Strafrecht, Deel I (Acco 1983) 184; V Vereecke, ‘Het eventueel opzet bij de 
beoordeling van het oogmerk om te doden’ [2019] Rechtspraak Antwerpen Brussel Gent 25, 26–27.; J De Groote, 
‘De bovengrens der fout en de ondergrens van het opzet met bijzondere aandacht voor het eventueel opzet: een 
doctrinale en rechtsvergelijkende analyse’ [2017] Nullum Crimen special number April 2017, 66, 75-79; B Ketels, 
‘De strafrechtelijke context van risicovol seksueel gedrag’ [2008] Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 354, 361; J 
Verhaegen, ‘Le dol éventuel et sa place en droit pénal belge’ in X (ed), Liber Amicorum Hermann Bekaert 
(Snoeck-Ducaju & Zoon 1977) 437, 441-442. 
83 Dupont states that potential intent is a weakening of the knowledge element and Vereecke states that it is a 
weakening of the will element. In my opinion both are correct and both elements are weakened. 
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relaxation of the knowledge element nor of the will element. The Council of State described it 
as a ‘potential knowing’ instead of a ‘real knowing’.84 
This ‘potential knowing’ can only be deduced from concrete elements of the file and 
not from abstract criteria.85 It is a way to prove intent rather than a form of intent, a type of ‘he 
should have known so he knew’-reasoning.86 If we combine both changes, we have a relaxation 
of the knowledge element and a rule of evidence. Although potential intent is a form of general 
intent, the relaxation of the knowledge element it entails, is not without danger in this context. 
The concept ‘contributing to the commission of a felony or standard offence by the group’ is 
an abstract one in any case and further relaxing the knowledge element to ‘could contribute’ 
makes it even more abstract and thus more vague. 
The actus reus of the offence is so broad it can encompass nearly any action and the 
mens rea is very broad and vague as well. As a result, people who in any way support a member 
of a terrorist group, without supporting the group itself and without wanting their actions to 
contribute to the committal of a felony or standard offence by the group, are being convicted 
anyway. Support to a member of the group is being fully equated to support to the group itself.87 
This is regrettable because many of those people may not be supporters of a terrorist group. 
They could simply be people who want to help their brother, son or lover, even though the 
latter have made very questionable choices. Employing the criminal justice system against a 
person whose only action is sending some clothes to their brother is not the best solution to say 
the least. All this leads to a legality issue: it grants very wide discretion to the judge and creates 
uncertainty in the minds of the person committing these actions about whether they are 
committing an offence.88 Therefore, the wording of the mens rea should be limited again to 
what is required by the Directive and the courts should require an actual link between the act 
of participation and the committal of a felony or standard offence by the group. These changes 
 
84 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State bij wetsvoorstel van 2 augustus 2016 tot wijziging van het Strafwetboek 
wat betreft de bestraffing van terrorisme, Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1579/006, 8. 
85 Ibid 9; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 35; Winants (n 6) 355. 
86 De Groote (n 82) 96-97; W Devroe and A Rombouts, ‘Wissel als witsel. De beteugeling van het witwassen van 
gelden via geldwissel in het Belgisch financieel en strafrecht (noot onder corr. Antwerpen 23 februari 1993)’ 
[1994] TRV 199, 204. 
87 This reduces a person to one aspect of their identity: that of member of the group. However, it could be sensible 
to emphasise other aspects of their identity (father, brother, etc.) which are not shared with the group, in order to 
make them break away from the group. If all ‘healthy contacts’ of a member of a terrorist group are being forced 
to keep a distance under threat of criminal action, the group member only has the group and its sympathisers to 
fall back on. This just strengthens their bond with the group and their break with the rest of society. 
88 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 7. 
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would bring the Belgian legislation back in line with the Directive and reduce the scope of the 
offence. 
1.2.3 Participating in the making of any decision regarding the activities of a terrorist 
organization 
The 2019 statute introduced a new paragraph to Article 140 CC. It was placed in 
between §1 and §2, creating an intermediate offence.89 This was intended to provide the courts 
with more options when assessing the broad spectrum of activities covered by Article 140, §1 
CC by upgrading some activities into a higher sentencing bracket. As an intermediate offence, 
Article 140, §1/1 CC punishes the participation in the taking of any decision in the context of 
the activities of the terrorist group.90 This offence is not part of the Directive. The Belgian 
legislature was inspired by the pre-existing Belgian offences concerning the criminal 
organization.91  
In the context of the offence of participating in the making of any decision in the 
framework of the activities of a criminal organization, Verbruggen states that ‘making any 
decision’ is not a suitable actus reus for an offence.92 We make a plethora of decisions every 
single day, making the criterion of ‘participating in the making of any decision’ void. The same 
criticism can be levelled against A140, §1/1 CC. Deciding what to drink during a meeting, 
whether or not to open the window, where to sit, etc. Those are all decisions, which will lead a 
person to commit this offence when they are made in the context of the activities of a terrorist 
group. Since making a decision is almost inevitable, anyone who came within the ambit of the 
offence of participating in the activities of the group, will now come within the ambit of this 
offence. As we have seen, this is a very broad category of people. The man who sent clothes to 
his brother the terrorist fighter decided to send those clothes, the woman who married the 
terrorist fighter decided to marry him, etc. Furthermore, not only making decisions is 
punishable, but also participating in the making of a decision. This means that a member of the 
group who voted against committing a terrorist attack falls under this offence. Even an outsider, 
non-member, who tries to convince his friend who is a member of a group not to do something 
stupid, is participating in the making of this decision. Therefore, it is clear the offence is too 
 
89 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 102-103; De Coensel (n 21) 214; Winants (n 6) 357. 
90 Art 75 wet van 5 mei 2019 (n 21). 
91 Art 324ter, §3 CC; Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 102-103; De Coensel (n 21) 214; 
Winants (n 6) 357. 
92 Verbruggen (n 53) 347–348. 
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broad. While the legislature attempted to create an offence which targets members of terrorists 
organizations higher up the ladder, it created one with an actus reus which is almost as broad 
as the offence of participating in the activities of the group. This offence with its exceedingly 
broad actus reus, which is not part of the Directive, runs afoul of the legality principle and the 
legislature would do well to delete it again. 
1.2.4 Leadership of a terrorist organization 
The second paragraph of Article 140 CC criminalizes leadership of a terrorist group. 
While the Directive imposes on member states the obligation to criminalize directing a terrorist 
group, the definition of leadership and directing is ambiguous. The preparatory works of the 
Belgian statute define leaders as ‘the people who take upon themselves the more important 
responsibilities within the group’.93 Further, leaders are ‘because of their central role within 
the terrorist group, better informed than anyone about the offences and take the final 
decisions’.94 The Council of State thought that the legislature should clarify the article so that 
it reflected this intention more clearly.95 Despite this advice, the legislature decided not the 
change the article. With the introduction of the offence in §1/1, the question now also arises as 
to what the difference is between a final decision (taken by a leader) and any other decision. 
The offence of leadership does not require that the person himself had the intention of 
committing a terrorist offence or that he was involved in committing it.96 Nor does it require 
that the person is the leader of the entire group. Having a central role, being able to speak for 
the group, coordinating actions, raising funds, etc. suffices.97 The size and importance of the 
group are irrelevant as well, so long as it is a terrorist group.98 
In practice, the jurisprudence interprets ‘leadership’ quite broadly. For example, the 
court of appeal in Antwerp found that it entails close involvement in several meetings, and not 
excluding that one would commit an attack himself.99 The fact that two other people were 
designated as respectively leader of the cell and spiritual leader, did not change this. The court 
 
93 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 14. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. 
94 Ibid. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. See also: De La Serna (n 16) 215; Fransen and Kerkhofs 
(n 16) 35–36; Winants (n 6) 348. 
95 Advies 34.362/4 van de Raad van State (n 53) 40-41. 
96 Cass. 24 juni 2008, Arr.Cass. 2008, 1654; De La Serna (n 6) 188; De La Serna (n 16) 215–216; Delhaise (n 16) 
44; De Nauw and Kuty (n 16) 18. 
97 De La Serna (n 6) 187–188; De La Serna (n 16) 215; Delhaise (n 16) 41; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 37; 
Winants (n 6) 348. 
98 Winants (n 6) 348. 
99 Antwerpen 8 januari 2014, 42. 
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of appeal in Brussels, in turn, convicted a person for leadership who provided material support 
to terrorist fighters in Syria (who were departing or already on-site), who was an intermediary 
and facilitated communication between jihadists100, jihadist candidates and their families, and 
who was an advisor when it came to indoctrination and exfiltration to Syria.101 Clearly these 
actions make them active members of the group, but not necessarily leaders. The ambiguity of 
this definition is also evidenced by the court of appeal’s jurisprudence which frequently 
overturns convictions for participation and converts them into leadership and vice versa.102 This 
is caused by the lacking definition of leadership in Article 140, §2 CC, and indicates that the 
legislature should have implemented the advice of the Council of State. The Belgian legislature 
was also not helped by the Directive, which does not define ‘directing’ either. 
1.3 Public provocation to commit terrorism 
1.3.1 Actus Reus 
Article 140bis CC was introduced in 2013, in response to the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism103 and the Council Framework Decision 
2008/919/JHA104. It is currently included in Article 5 of the Directive. Since its introduction 
into Belgian law, the actus reus of the offence was the following: disseminating or otherwise 
making available to the public a message when such conduct, whether or not directly aimed at 
the commission of terrorist offences, carries a risk that one or more of these offences may be 
committed. Evidently, the Belgian legislature criminalized both direct and indirect incitement 
to commit a terrorist offence.105 The general rules on public incitement, which are applicable 
to all felonies and standard offences, only criminalize direct incitement.106  
Several factors are important for the analysis of whether or not there is a risk that 
terrorist offences may be committed. These factors are: the perpetrator (e.g. whether he is a 
person of influence and charisma), the receiver (e.g. the amount of people who receive the 
message and how easy they are to influence), the nature of the message (e.g. whether the words 
 
100 In this case it concerned people who traveled to Syria to join Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, Jabbat Al-Nusra 
and/or Islamic State. 
101 Brussel 2 juni 2017, 26-30. 
102 Brussel 19 januari 2007, Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 2008, 281; Antwerpen 8 januari 2014; Brussel 18 november 
2016; Brussel 31 maart 2017. 
103 Art 5 Council of Europe Convention (n 1). 
104 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA (n 3). 
105 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 11; Delhaise (n 16) 48; Winants (n 6) 350. 
106 Art 66 CC; MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 11. 
165 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
themselves call for violence or hatred) and the context (e.g. political tension).107 In the original 
bill, the risk that one or more terrorist offences is committed was not required.108 However, the 
Council of State pointed out that this risk requirement was part of the European instruments 
and that omitting it might lead the offence to violate the freedom of expression.109 Thus, the 
legislature amended the bill to remedy this issue, stating that: 
it is imperative to specify that the criminalization of public incitement to commit 
terrorist acts must not lead to the punishment of acts which have no connection whatsoever 
with terrorism and would thus create the danger of restricting the freedom of expression. 
Therefore, it is important to stress that these offences may only be aimed at those situations in 
which there are serious indications that a danger exists that a terrorist offence would be 
committed.110 
However, in 2016 the legislation was amended again. The legislature vaguely referred 
to the altered security situation, the foreign terrorist fighter problem and the role of social media 
in radicalization, to delete the risk requirement because it was too difficult to prove.111 
When Article 140bis CC was initially introduced into the Criminal Code in 2013, an 
appeal for annulment was filed with the Constitutional Court. One of the arguments made for 
annulment was based on freedom of expression. The Constitutional Court stated that freedom 
of expression is one of the pillars of a democratic society and therefore exceptions need to be 
interpreted strictly.112 Thus, Article 140bis CC must comply with Article 10.2 ECHR.113  
It follows that the legislature must demonstrate that the restrictions are necessary in a 
democratic society, that they correspond to an overriding societal need and that they remain 
proportionate to the legitimate objectives they pursue.114 The Court stated that it is necessary 
to protect society against those who would undercut it through violence and terrorism.115 The 
 
107 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 12-13. Delhaise (n 16) 51; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 
52–53; Winants (n 6) 350. 
108 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 19-20; Velaers (n 1) 779; Winants (n 6) 354. 
109 Advies 51.806/3 van de Raad van State bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 tot wijziging van Titel 1ter 
van het Strafwetboek, Parl.St. Kamer 2012-13, nr. 53-2502/001, (22) 25-27; Velaers (n 1) 779; Winants (n 6) 354. 
110 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 12. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. 
111 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 juli 2016 houdende diverse bepalingen ter bestrijding van terrorisme (III), Parl.St. 
Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1951/001, (4) 8; De Coensel (n 70) 184; Delhaise (n 16) 49; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 
51; Winants (n 6) 353–354. 
112 GwH 28 januari 2015, 9/2015, TVW 2015, 179, B.24. 
113 Ibid B.25.3. 
114 Ibid B.24 and B.25.3.  
115 Ibid B.25.4. 
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government may limit freedom of expression to attain that goal. The legislature had stated it 
did not aim to punish actions that are not connected to terrorism. This, in combination with the 
special intent required and the fact that the judge needs to take into account the person who 
spreads the message, the person who receives it, and the nature and the context of the message, 
makes that although the judge has a wide margin of appreciation, Article 140bis CC does not 
violate the freedom of expression.116  
After the deletion of the risk requirement, however, the article was brought before the 
Constitutional Court again. The Court made the same analysis of restrictions to the freedom of 
expression. Yet, this time the Court’s conclusion was that Article 140bis CC did violate the 
freedom of expression and the article deleting the risk requirement was annulled.117 The need 
to facilitate the proof of the offence does not justify the imposition of an imprisonment and fine 
when there are no serious indications that there is a risk of a terrorist offence. Therefore, Article 
140bis CC, without the risk requirement is not necessary in a democratic society and limits the 
freedom of expression unduly.118 In closing, the Court remarks that both the Framework 
Decision and the Directive include such a risk requirement.119 Because of the annulment of the 
part of the article that deleted the risk requirement, the risk requirement was revived and is part 
of Article 140bis CC again. 
The Criminal Code criminalizes the dissemination or otherwise making available of a 
message to the public. This implies a positive action and refraining from undertaking a certain 
action can therefore not suffice.120 In order to be punishable, the incitement does not have to be 
aimed at a specific person or group of people (intuitu personae).121 Therefore, incitement can 
easily happen over the internet as well, as long as it is public.122 Any mode of dissemination 
can be punishable.123 The message has to be made available to the public, which means that 
one conversation between two people is probably not covered.124 According to the case law, 
however, even individual messages to people can be public because the internet allows them 
 
116 Ibid B.25.4-B.25.5. 
117 GwH 15 maart 2018, 31/2018, Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 2018, 477, B.8. See also: De Coensel (n 70) 184; 
Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 53–54; Winants (n 6) 354. 
118 GwH 15 maart 2018, 31/2018, Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 2018, 477, B.7.6. See also: Delhaise (n 16) 49; 
Winants (n 6) 354; Ward Yperman, ‘Terro III dan toch een stap te ver’ [2018] Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 480. 
119 GwH 15 maart 2018, 31/2018, Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 2018, 477, B.7.7. See also: Delhaise (n 16) 50; 
Winants (n 6) 354. 
120 Delhaise (n 16) 50. 
121 Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 55; Winants (n 6) 350. 
122 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 13; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 55; Winants (n 6) 350. 
123 Delhaise (n 16) 50. 
124 ibid 50–51. 
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to spread and multiply quickly.125 In addition, the incitement does not have to be aimed at the 
committal of a concrete offence.126 Nor does the incited offence actually have to take place.127 
1.3.2 Mens Rea 
A special intent is required, being ‘the intention of inciting the commission of one of 
the offences referred to in Article 137 or 140sexies, with the exception of the offence referred 
to in Article 137, § 3, 6°’.128 The article thus refers to terrorism stricto sensu, with the exception 
of threatening a terrorist offence, and the offence of traveling for terrorist purposes (see below). 
This corresponds to the Directive, except for traveling, which is not part of the mens rea in the 
Directive. It was not part of the original mens rea in Belgian law either, since the offence did 
not exist yet in 2013, but was added in 2016.129 In doing so, the Belgian legislature took a more 
repressive approach than the Directive. Since the traveling offence has a very broad mens rea 
itself (see below), the mens rea of Article 140bis CC is broad too, and significantly broader 
than the Directive’s. In 2016 the legislature also added the words ‘directly or indirectly’ after 
the word intention because when deleting the risk requirement, they also deleted the reference 
to indirect incitement. To clarify that the offence included indirect incitement, the legislature 
explicitly inserted it into the mens rea.130 However, after the Constitutional Court judgment, 
which reinstated the risk requirement, this idea of ‘direct or indirect incitement’ was part of the 
offence twice.131 Therefore, the legislature deleted it from the mens rea again in 2019.132  
1.4 Terrorist recruitment 
1.4.1 Actus Reus 
Article 140ter CC criminalizes recruitment for terrorist purposes. It was also introduced 
in 2013, in the wake of the Council of Europe Convention and the update of the Framework 
Decision and is now Article 6 of the Directive.133 The article criminalizes anybody who recruits 
 
125 Corr. West-Vlaanderen (afd. Brugge) 26 juli 2018, 10; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 60–61. 
126 Delhaise (n 16) 52; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 55–56; Winants (n 6) 350. 
127 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 tot wijziging van het Strafwetboek wat betreft de 
bestraffing van terrorisme, Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1579/005, 6; Winants (n 6) 350. 
128 Art 140bis CC. Own translation, original in Dutch and French. See also: MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 
2012 (n 7) 13; Delhaise (n 16) 52; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 56; Winants (n 6) 350. 
129 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 juli 2016 (n 111) 7; Delhaise (n 16) 49; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 51. 
130 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 juli 2016 (n 111) 8; Delhaise (n 16) 49; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 57. 
131 Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 54–55; Winants (n 6) 354; Yperman, ‘Terro III dan toch een stap te ver’ (n 118). 
132 Art 76 wet van 5 mei 2019 (n 21); Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 103; Winants (n 6) 
357. 
133 Art 6 Council of Europe Convention (n 1); Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA (n 3); MvT bij 
wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 14. 
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another person to commit or contribute to the commission of one of the offences in Article 137, 
140 or 140sexies CC, with the exception of Article 137, §3, 6° CC. So this is terrorism stricto 
sensu, with the exception of threatening terrorism, the offences relating to terrorist groups, and 
traveling for terrorist purposes.134 This matches the Directive, with the exception of traveling, 
which was added by the Belgian legislature in 2016 when the traveling offence was created.135 
The part reading ‘or contribution to the commission’, was added in 2019,136 as it was included 
in the Directive, but not yet in the Belgian legislation.137 If necessary, these actions could be 
prosecuted under Article 140 CC or as aiding and abetting.138 However, since 2016 this phrase 
was part of the offence in Article 141 CC (see below) and to maintain uniformity, the legislature 
decided to also introduce it into Article 140ter CC.139 This addition maintained uniformity at 
the cost of increased overlap. There will be very few situations of recruiting a person to 
contribute to the commission of a terrorist offence, which are not covered by Article 140 CC. 
This situation will always involve three people (the recruiter, the contributor to the ultimately 
intended offence and its perpetrator) and three people is the threshold for a terrorist group. 
Even if there is no terrorist group, the rules on aiding and abetting apply both to the recruitment 
offence and to the ultimately intended terrorist offence. Instead of criminalizing new situations, 
the addition of this phrase predominantly brought situations within the ambit of this offence 
which were already covered by other terrorist offences, therefore reducing clarity and 
simplicity.  
An exact definition of recruitment has not been provided by the legislature. In the 
context of human trafficking, the Court of Cassation has stated that recruitment needs to be 
understood in its normal meaning.140 Hence, enlisting people or getting someone to join a group 
is recruitment.141 For the offence of recruitment to take place, it is not required that the recruited 
person actually commits one of the offences he was recruited for.142 What is required, is that 
 
134 Delhaise (n 16) 55; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 61; Winants (n 6) 351. 
135 Art 3 wet van 3 augustus 2016 houdende diverse bepalingen ter bestrijding van terrorisme (III), BS 11 augustus 
2016, 50973; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 62; Winants (n 6) 353. 
136 Art 77, 1° wet van 5 mei 2019 (n 21); De Coensel (n 21) 212. 
137 Art 6 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4); Winants (n 6) 357. 
138 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 104. 
139 Ibid 104-105. 
140 Cass. 8 oktober 2014, P.14.0955.F. 
141 Delhaise (n 16) 55. 
142 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 14; Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 
(n 127) 6; Delhaise (n 16) 55; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 61; Winants (n 6) 351. 
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the recruiter successfully approaches the other person, meaning he convinced him to perpetrate 
the offence.143 
1.4.2 Mens Rea 
Article 140ter CC does not explicitly include a mens rea. However, this does not mean 
there is no mens rea.144 Belgian criminal law always requires both actus reus and mens rea.145 
The Directive states the offence must be committed intentionally. However, since the Belgian 
legislation requires special intent for nearly all terrorist offences, it would be logical to also 
require special intent. It is therefore generally accepted that ‘recruitment to commit’ one of the 
offences mentioned above, means ‘recruitment with the aim of seeing one of these offences 
being committed’.146 This is form of special intent. As was explained above, the traveling 
offence was added to the mens rea in 2016, expanding it beyond the scope of offence in the 
Directive. The Belgian offence is therefore broader, and vaguer than the one in the Directive.  
1.5 Providing training for terrorism 
1.5.1 Actus Reus 
For both the actus reus and mens rea of this offence (Article 140quater CC), the Belgian 
legislature passed wording very similar to the European instruments.147 The actus reus is to 
instruct or provide training in the manufacturing or use of explosives, firearms or other 
weapons or harmful or dangerous substances or in other specific methods and techniques.148 
This is a non-exhaustive list, so any training or instruction that is provided with the required 
mens rea can fall within the scope of this article. For example, flying or driving lessons, or 
lessons on how to hack a website, can all constitute training in the sense of Article 140quater 
 
143 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 14; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 61; Winants (n 6) 351. 
Delhaise talks about the proposal being received (‘la proposition du recruteur est accueillie par la personne 
approchée’ (Delhaise (n 16) 55.)). 
144 Cass. 12 mei 1987, AR728, Arr.Cass. 1986-87, 1194; Cass. 13 december 1994, P.94.0736.N, Arr.Cass. 1994, 
1104; Damien Vandermeersch, Eléments de droit pénal et de procédure pénale (die Keure / la Charte 2015) 166–
172. 
145 Winants (n 6) 359. 
146 Delhaise (n 16) 56; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 62–63; Winants (n 6) 351. 
147 Art. 7 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). See also: Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 64. 
148 Art 140quater CC. 
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CC.149 The training provided can be theoretic or practical.150 Both ‘instruct’ and ‘provide’ imply 
an action on behalf of the perpetrator.151 
1.5.2 Mens Rea 
The mens rea is a special intent, being: with a view to commit or contribute to the 
commission of one of the offences referred to in Article 137, with the exception of the offence 
referred to in Article 137, §3, 6° CC.152 So the training has to be provided with the view to 
commit or contribute to the commission of terrorism stricto sensu, once more with the 
exception of threatening a terrorist attack. Here too, the part ‘or contribute to the commission 
of’ was added in 2019153, because this is part of the wording of the Directive and the legislature 
wanted to increase coherence.154 Concreteness is not required, so the person providing the 
training does not need to know the exact terrorist offence for which he is providing training.155 
1.6 Receiving training for terrorism or self-study 
1.6.1 Actus Reus 
Together with the offence of providing instruction or training, the legislature introduced 
the offence of receiving training for terrorism,156 stating that it made operational and logical 
sense to also criminalize the person who receives the training.157 The wording of this offence 
also closely resembles that of the Directive.158 Article 140quinquies CC criminalizes anybody 
who, in Belgium or abroad, receives instruction or training as described in Article 140quater 
CC. The article explicitly refers to Article 140quater CC regarding the type of instruction or 
training, so anything said there is also applicable here.159 
In 2019, the legislature added a new section to Article 140quinquies CC.160 This section 
contains a second offence. The actus reus of this offence is: in Belgium or abroad, acquiring 
 
149 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 15; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 64; Winants (n 6) 351. 
150 Delhaise (n 16) 58. 
151 ibid 57. 
152 Art 140quater CC; MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 15; Delhaise (n 16) 58; Fransen and 
Kerkhofs (n 16) 65. 
153 Art 78, 1° wet van 5 mei 2019 (n 21); De Coensel (n 21) 212. 
154 Art 7 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4); Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 104-105; Winants 
(n 6) 357. 
155 Delhaise (n 16) 58 and 78; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 65; Winants (n 6) 351. 
156 Art 7 wet van 18 februari 2013 (n 19). 
157 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 16; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 67. 
158 Art. 8 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
159 Delhaise (n 16) 60; Winants (n 6) 351. 
160 Art 79, 2° wet van 5 mei 2019 (n 21). 
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knowledge yourself or educating yourself in the matters referred to in Article 140quater CC. 
Due to the wording of the first section, it is generally accepted that its scope only covers people 
receiving training from somebody else.161 As the considerations to the Directive state that 
training should also include self-study162, the legislature decided to introduce this second 
section specifically targeting self-study.163 In the preparatory works, the legislature emphasizes 
that occasionally visiting a website, or visiting it for academic purposes does not suffice to be 
punishable. There needs to be an active and conscious action of the perpetrator.164 
Both sections explicitly state that the training is received or undertaken in Belgium or 
abroad.165 This is not specified in the offence of providing training, nor in many of the other 
terrorist offences. It is unclear why the legislature decided to specify this in Article 
140quinquies CC.166 It is highly unlikely that the Belgian legislature intended to imply that the 
other offences, such as providing training, are not punishable if they did not take place on 
Belgian soil. As imposed by the Directive167, the Belgian legislation includes grounds of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorism.168 Furthermore, in one of the examples in the 
preparatory works of Article 140quater explicitly refers to training provided abroad.169 
1.6.2 Mens Rea 
The mens rea for both offences in Article 140quinquies CC is a form of special intent: 
with a view to commit or contribute to the commission of one of the offences referred to in 
Article 137, with the exception of the offence referred to in Article 137, § 3, 6°.170 Thus, the 
mens rea also requires the training has to be received or undertaken with the view to commit 
or contribute to the commission of terrorism stricto sensu, with the exception of threatening a 
terrorist attack. In section 1 of the article, the part ‘or contribute to the commission of’ was 
added in 2019171, because this is part of the wording of the Directive and the legislature wanted 
to increase coherence (see above).172 Section 2 of the article was only introduced in 2019, with 
 
161 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 106; Delhaise (n 16) 60–61; Winants (n 6) 357. 
162 Consideration 11 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4); Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 106. 
163 De Coensel (n 21) 213–214. 
164 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 106; Winants (n 6) 357. 
165 Winants (n 6) 351. 
166 Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 67. 
167 Art 19 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). Originally art 9 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA (n 2). 
168 Art 6, 1°ter and 10ter, 4° VTSv. See also: De La Serna (n 6) 209; Hameeuw (n 15) 10–11; Weyembergh and 
Kennes (n 6) 155; Winants (n 6) 349. 
169 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 13 november 2012 (n 7) 16; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 67–68. 
170 Art 140quinquies CC; Delhaise (n 16) 62; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 68. 
171 Art 79, 1° wet van 5 mei 2019 (n 21); De Coensel (n 21) 212; Winants (n 6) 357. 
172 Art 8 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4); Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 106. 
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this phrase already in it. Concreteness is not required, so the person receiving or undertaking 
the training does not need to know the exact terrorist offence for which he is training.173 
1.7 Terrorist travel 
1.7.1 Actus Reus 
When the issue of foreign terrorist fighters took the foreground, the UN Security 
Council issued a resolution stating member states should criminalize terrorist travel.174 Similar 
provisions were included in an additional protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism and in the Directive.175 The Belgian legislature fulfilled these 
international obligations by introducing Article 140sexies into the Criminal Code.176 The actus 
reus of this offence is leaving177 or entering178 the national territory. The wording of the article 
implies the actus reus is present once the person crosses the Belgian border, not when he starts 
or ends his journey.179 
1.7.2 Mens Rea 
The mens rea is the aim to commit or contribute to the commission, in Belgium or 
abroad, of one of the offences meant in Article 137, 140 to 140quinquies and 141 CC, with the 
exception of the offence in Article 137, §3, 6°. This covers all terrorist offences under Belgian 
law, except for threatening a terrorist offence stricto sensu180 and preparing a terrorist offence 
stricto sensu181. This is broader than the Directive, which does not include incitement and 
recruitment but at the same time it is also slightly narrower since the Directive does not exclude 
threatening. Concreteness is not required, so the traveler does not need to know exactly which 
terrorist offence he will commit.182 A fortiori it is not required that the intended offence is 
 
173 Delhaise (n 16) 62; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 68; Winants (n 6) 351. 
174 UNSC Resolution 2178 (n 1). See also: MvT bij wetsontwerp van 22 juni 2015 tot versterking van de strijd 
tegen terrorisme, Parl.St. Kamer 2014-15, nr. 54-1198/001, 5; Blaise and Delhaise (n 26) 173–174; De Coensel 
(n 70) 220; Velaers (n 1) 787. 
175 Art 4 Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 2015, CETS 
217; Art 9 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4); G Stessens, ‘Terroristen op reis: over de strafbaarstelling van reizen 
met terroristisch oogmerk en andere maatregelen ter beperking van de reisvrijheid van (vermeende) terroristen’ 
in S Dewulf (ed), La [CVDW] Liber Amicorum Chris Van den Wyngaert (Maklu 2017) 443–445. 
176 Art 2 wet van 20 juli 2015 tot versterking van de strijd tegen het terrorisme, BS 5 augustus 2015, 49326; MvT 
bij wetsontwerp van 22 juni 2015 (n 174) 5. 
177 Art 140sexies, 1° CC. 
178 Art 140sexies, 2° CC. 
179 Delhaise (n 16) 63–64. 
180 Art 137, §3, 6° CC. 
181 Art 140septies CC. 
182 Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 32) 180; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 72; Winants (n 6) 352. 
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actually committed.183 This is a special intent, which needs to be present at the moment of the 
actus reus, being the traveling.184  
In 2019, the scope of Article 140sexies CC was further extended. Similar to many of 
the other terrorist offences, the Directive requires member states to criminalize not only travel 
to commit a terrorist offence, but also travel to contribute to the commission of such an 
offence.185 As a result, the legislature inserted the words ‘or contributing to the commission’ 
twice (both for leaving and for entering the national territory) in Article 140sexies CC.186 Many 
of these actions were already punishable under (attempted) Article 140 CC or (participation in) 
one of the other terrorist offences lato sensu187. Nevertheless, the legislature wanted to increase 
coherence and legal certainty and therefore thought the addition necessary.188 Again, while 
increasing coherence, this also increased overlap and this while the Belgian traveling offence 
is broader already than required by the Directive.  
1.8 Preparing a terrorist attack 
1.8.1 Actus Reus 
In 2016, the legislature introduced further restrictions to curtail terrorism.189 In this 
context, they criminalized preparatory actions, because a terrorist offence is often impossible 
without these actions.190 The Directive does not contain a similar offence. Indeed, it simply 
states that criminalizing preparatory acts undertaken by a person entering a member state with 
the intention to commit or contribute to the commission of terrorism stricto sensu is a way to 
respond to terrorist travel.191 Article 140septies CC criminalizes persons who prepare a terrorist 
offence as defined in Article 137 CC, with the exception of Article 137, §3, 6°. This relates to 
every terrorist offence stricto sensu except those threatening terrorism.  
 
183 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 22 juni 2015 (n 174) 6; Blaise and Delhaise (n 26) 174; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 
16) 70; Delhaise (n 16) 65; Winants (n 6) 352. 
184 Advies 57.127/AV van de Raad van State van 24 maart 2015, Parl.St. Kamer 2014-15, nr. 54-1198/001, 18; 
Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 32) 179-180; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 70–71; Delhaise (n 16) 65; Winants (n 6) 
352. 
185 Art 9 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
186 Art 80 wet van 5 mei 2019 (n 21Error! Bookmark not defined.); Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 
2019 (n 8) 106-107; De Coensel (n 21) 212; Winants (n 6) 357. 
187 Meaning: all other terrorist offences next to terrorism stricto sensu (art 140 – 141 CC), all of which are 
discussed in this article. 
188 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 6 februari 2019 (n 8) 104–105. 
189 Samenvatting van wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 tot wijziging van het Strafwetboek wat betreft de 
bestraffing van terrorisme, Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1579/001, 1. 
190 Toelichting bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 80) 4. 
191 Art. 9.2 (b) Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
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The second paragraph of the article includes a list of actions that can be preparation, 
e.g. gathering information on and observing locations, occurrences, events or people which 
makes it possible to carry out a terrorist attack (including online observation)192 and 
purchasing, transporting, manufacturing or searching for objects or substances which are of 
such a nature that they can be dangerous to other people or cause substantial economic damage, 
like explosives, or materials to create explosives193. This list, however, is non-exhaustive.194 
Any act can be an act of preparation, depending on the context, and omissions can also be a 
form of preparation.195 The Council of State found that a non-exhaustive list does not 
necessarily violate the legality principle, on the condition that the general description of the 
offence is sufficiently detailed, clear and predictable.196 On the one hand the list needed to be 
non-exhaustive because terrorism is a changeable form of criminality.197 On the other hand, 
some type of list was needed in order to delimit the offence and to indicate the type of conduct 
particularly intended.198 The preparatory works state that it is not the intention to target people 
who provide limited and non-decisive help.199 However, that help can be considered as aiding 
and abetting the preparation of a terrorist offence or financing terrorism.200 This is another 
offence with an open-ended and broad actus reus and therefore there is a strong importance on 
the mens rea.201 
Preparation is not to be confused with an attempted offence. Under Belgian criminal 
law, there is an attempted offence, if the intention to commit the offence has been manifested 
by external acts which constitute the beginning of the commission of that offence and which 
have ceased or have missed their effect solely as a result of circumstances beyond the control 
of the perpetrator.202 In general criminal law, preparatory actions that are not the beginning of 
 
192 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 9; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 76. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Delhaise (n 16) 69; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 75; Winants (n 6) 356. 
195 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 10; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 76; Winants 
(n 6) 356. 
196 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 13; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 75. Delhaise (n 16) 69. 
197 Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 75. 
198 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 10. 
199 Ibid 3; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 75. 
200 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 3. 
201 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 5 juli 2016 houdende diverse bepalingen ter bestrijding van terrorisme (III), Parl.St. 
Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1951/001, (4) 25-26 and 29; Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 10; Delhaise 
(n 16) 69; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 75; Winants (n 6) 355. 
202 Art 51 CC; Delhaise (n 16) 81; De Nauw and Deruyck (n 22) 69–71; Vandermeersch (n 144) 82–88. 
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the commission of the offence are not punishable.203 The idea behind criminalizing preparatory 
acts, is not to wait for the beginning of the commission of the offence but intervene sooner.204 
However, the preparatory works explain that sometimes actions listed as preparation can be a 
beginning of the commission of the offence as well, depending on the circumstances of the 
case.205 
1.8.2 Mens Rea 
As was the case for Article 140ter CC, the mens rea is not explicitly in the text of Article 
140septies CC either. The preparatory works explain that next to the actus reus the intention 
to commit a terrorist offence as described in Article 137 CC is necessary.206 The action never 
suffices. This intention is a form of special intent and for this offence there is a requirement of 
concreteness: the prosecution has to prove which offence was intended.207 The Council of State 
emphasized the importance of concrete and consistent factual elements that provide proof of 
the intention to commit a terrorist offence.208 However, this intent is not quite clear. On the one 
hand, the preparatory works explain that an offence prepared by one person can also be 
executed by another.209 On the other hand, they state that the mens rea is the intention to 
commit a terrorist offence. If someone prepares a terrorist offence for somebody else, he does 
not have the intention of committing one himself. The Council of State pointed towards this 
inconsistency and asked for clarification.210 The legislature did not amend the article but did 
explain to the Council of State that Article 140septies CC is only meant to target people who 
 
203 Winants (n 6) 355. Other statutes that criminalise preparatory actions are the statute on combating piracy at sea 
and the statute on the trade of narcotics. See: art 3, § 1, c), wet van 30 december 2009 (n 17); art 2bis, §6 and 
2quater, 6° wet van 7 februari 2014 tot wijziging van de wet van 24 februari 1921 betreffende het verhandelen 
van gifstoffen, slaapmiddelen en verdovende middelen, psychotrope stoffen, ontsmettingsstoffen en antiseptica 
en van de stoffen die kunnen gebruikt worden voor de illegale vervaardiging van verdovende middelen en 
psychotrope stoffen, BS 6 maart 1921, 1834; Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 6.  
204 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 5; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 76. 
205 Ibid. This has been made clear in the case law as well. The correctional court and court of appeal of Brussels 
convicted defendants for participating in an attempted terrorist attack because they had, among other things, 
fabricated false documents, searched for a safe house, rented vehicles, and bought weapons and materials to build 
explosives (Brussel 31 maart 2017, 34-36; Corr. Brussel 5 juli 2016). All these things are listed as possible 
preparatory actions in the Criminal Code. 
206 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 8; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 77. 
207 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 14; Verslag van de eerste lezing namens de tijdelijke commissie 
‘terrorismebestrijding’ bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 tot wijziging van het Strafwetboek wat betreft de 
bestraffing van terrorisme, Parl.St Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1579/008, 5-6; Delhaise (n 16) 71; Fransen and 
Kerkhofs (n 16) 77. 
208 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 12; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 77. 
209 Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 3. 
210 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 12; advies 59.147/3 van de Raad van State State bij wetsontwerp 
van 6 juli 2016 houdende diverse bepalingen ter bestrijding van terrorisme (III), Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-
1951/001, (19) 27-28. 
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prepare their own terrorist offence.211 People preparing another’s terrorist offence, are 
potentially liable as accomplices.  
1.9 Financing a terrorist 
1.9.1 Actus reus 
The final Belgian terrorist offence is a first-generation offence, introduced in 2003.212 
This offence was not included in the Framework Decision, but in the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, signed by Belgium on 27 September 
2001.213 Currently, Article 11 of the Directive includes the offence of terrorist financing.  
This offence was not included in the first draft bill of the 2003 statute because Article 
140, §1 CC already explicitly refers to the financing of terrorism. However, the Council of 
State noted that Article 140 CC. only covered a certain form of financing, namely the financing 
of a terrorist group.214 As the financing of individual terrorists was also of interest to the 
legislature, Article 141 CC was inserted.215  
The offence introduced in 2003 criminalized ‘any person who except in the cases 
referred to in Article 140, provides material resources, including financial assistance, with a 
view to committing a terrorist offence referred to in Article 137’.216 However, in its 
recommendations, the Financial Action Task Force (hereafter FATF) stressed that terrorist 
financing offences should not require that the funds are linked to a specific terrorist act.217 
According to the FATF, collecting or providing funds to one or two people (i.e. outside of the 
situation of Article 140 CC) does not seem to be covered by Article 141 CC, if the connection 
 
211 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 17; Verslag van de eerste lezing namens de tijdelijke commissie 
‘terrorismebestrijding’ bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 207) 5; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 75; Winants 
(n 6) 356. Contra: Delhaise (n 16) 70–71. 
212 Art 7 wet van 19 december 2003 (n 58). 
213 Art 2 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York 9 December 
1999); De La Serna (n 6) 193; Hameeuw (n 15) 9; Winants (n 6) 349. 
214 Advies 34.362/4 van de Raad van State (n 53) 40. 
215 MvT bij wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 48) 9 and 14–15; Verslag namens de commissie van justitie bij 
wetsontwerp van 6 oktober 2003 (n 33) 23; De La Serna (n 6) 192–193; Hameeuw (n 15) 9; Weyembergh and 
Kennes (n 6) 154; Winants (n 6) 348. 
216 Art 141 CC as introduced by art 7 wet van 19 december 2003 (n 58). Own translation, original in Dutch and 
French. See also: Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 78. 
217 Recommendation 5 FATF international standards on combating money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism & proliferation, updated June 2019, 11, <www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> (accessed 12 
June 2020). See in the original recommendations as well: FATF IX Special Recommendations, October 2001, 5, 
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to a specific terrorist offence cannot be established. Therefore, Article 141 did not fully comply 
with this recommendation.218 In order to resolve this issue, the article was amended in 2016.219 
Three slightly different amendments were proposed, but in the end the one that resembled the 
EU Directive most closely was preferred.220 
The current version of Article 141 CC criminalizes the direct or indirect provision or 
collection of material resources, including financial assistance, by any means.221 Compared to 
the original article, Article 141 is now not only aimed at people who provide resources but also 
those who collect them.222 The legislature notes that the wording of the new article is broader 
than the original one, but that this does not necessarily mean that the original article did not 
encompass the elements that were made more specific in the new wording.223 For example, the 
Directive includes providing or collecting funds, by ‘any means, directly or indirectly’.224 The 
legislature copied this to the new Article 141 CC, but explicitly stated that this does not mean 
it was not already covered in the original article.225 The words ‘material resources, including 
financial assistance’ were not altered. According to the FATF they were already sufficiently 
broad.226 
1.9.2 Mens Rea 
The mens rea is a special intent, for which there are two options.227 The resources have 
to be provided or collected with the intention that they be used, or in the knowledge that they 
are to be used, in full or in part, (1°) to commit or contribute to the commission of a terrorist 
offence stricto sensu or lato sensu228, or (2°) by another person when the person providing or 
 
218 FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures -Belgium, Fourth Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report (2015) 160, <www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-belgium-
2015.html> (accessed 12 June 2020). 
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220 Verslag van de eerste lezing namens de namens de tijdelijke ‘terrorismebestrijding’ bij wetsvoorstel van 13 
januari 2016 (n 207) 14; Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 tot wijziging van het 
Strafwetboek wat betreft de bestraffing van terrorisme, Parl.St. Kamer 2015-16, nr. 54-1579/007, 2-3; Fransen 
and Kerkhofs (n 16) 79; Winants (n 6) 356. 
221 Art 141 CC; Delhaise (n 16) 72. 
222 Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 4; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 79; Winants 
(n 6) 356. 
223 Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 3-4.  
224 Art 11.1 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
225 Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 4; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 79. 
226 FATF (n 218) 159. See also: ibid; Winants (n 6) 356. 
227 Delhaise (n 16) 72–73; Winants (n 6) 356. 
228 Meaning: all other terrorist offences next to terrorism stricto sensu (art 140 – 141 CC), all of which were 
discussed in this article.  
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collecting the resources knows that this other person is committing or will commit terrorism 
stricto sensu.229 This is significantly broader than the mens rea from 2003. 
1° is a copy from the Directive.230 Compared to the original article, 1° expanded the 
offences of which the financing is criminalized from terrorism stricto sensu to all terrorist 
offences, including participating in the activities of a terrorist group and preparing a terrorist 
offence.231 Furthermore, the legislature ensured that a connection with a specific terrorist act 
was not required. The new wording clarified that it is not necessary the resources are actually 
used or that the perpetrator knows which specific offences they will be used for.232 This is 
explicitly required by the Directive when the financing concerns terrorism stricto sensu, 
terrorist offences relating to a terrorist group or traveling for terrorist purposes.233 Belgium, 
however, deemed this too restrictive and the legislature clarified that it also applies for the other 
terrorist offences.234 
In 2° the legislature emphasized that helping an individual terrorist is also an offence, 
as required by the FATF.235 The legislature stated that the Council of State did not express any 
objections about this.236 This is strange because the Council of State had questioned the 
distinction between 1° and 2°. According to the Council, 1° already includes financing an 
individual terrorist.237 The legislature never replied to this observation, even though the Council 
of State was correct. Providing resources in the knowledge that they are to be used to commit 
a terrorist offence stricto sensu (1°) or providing them in the knowledge that they are to be used 
by another person when the person providing or collecting the resources knows that this other 
person is committing or will commit terrorism stricto sensu (2°) is the same thing.238 Therefore, 
1° includes 2°, making the latter moot. By not adhering to the wording of the Directive, but 
 
229 Art 141 CC. 
230 Art 11.1 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4); Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 5. 
231 Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 5; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 80. 
232 Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 5-6; Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 79; Winants 
(n 6) 356. Although under the old wording, it could be argued that it was not required that the terrorist act was 
committed either. See: De La Serna (n 6) 194. 
233 Art 11.2 Directive (EU) 2017/541 (n 4). 
234 Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 6. 
235 Ibid; Amendement nr. 1 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 127) 12. 
236 Amendement nr. 3 bij wetsvoorstel van 13 januari 2016 (n 220) 6. 
237 Advies 59.789/3 van de Raad van State (n 84) 21-22; Advies 59.147/3 van de Raad van State (n 210) 31-32; 
Delhaise (n 16) 73. Fransen and Kerkhofs (n 16) 80. 
238 Delhaise (n 16) 73. 
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unnecessarily adding 2°, the Belgian legislature created confusion about 1°, making the scope 
of the offence less clear. 
2. Broadness, vagueness and overlap 
The introduction of most of the aforementioned offences was challenged before the 
Belgian Constitutional Court indicating their apparent broadness and vagueness. Indeed, an 
appeal for nullification was filed against the introduction of Articles 137 and 138 CC, based 
on the legality principle and the prohibition of discrimination.239 The introduction of Articles 
140bis to 140quinquies CC was appealed as well, again based on the legality principle and the 
freedom of expression and association.240 The introduction of Article 140sexies CC, 
finally, was appealed based on the principle of legality and the free movement of persons.241 
All these appeals were rejected by the Constitutional Court, which makes the risk element of 
the offence of Article 140bis CC (see above) the only part of the terrorist offences that was 
annulled to date. 
As the Directive sets out a broad range of acts that should be punishable in Member 
States, Member States are free to choose how it is implemented. Belgium chose to create new 
offences for every act the Directive lists while closely adhering to the wording of the Directive. 
The goal of these offences is to intervene as early as possible and prevent prospective terrorists 
from attempting to perpetrate an attack.242 One of the state’s main duties is to prevent harm 
befalling its citizens.243 This is reflected in for example the ECHR, which imposes a positive 
obligation upon states to protect the right to life of the people under their jurisdiction and to 
protect them against inhuman or degrading treatment and torture.244 This need to prevent leads 
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to offences such as participating in the activities of a terrorist group, traveling for terrorist 
purposes, or self-study, which have very broad actus rei which include daily neutral actions. 
This makes the mens rea the core element of the offence. The mens rea is internal and always 
has to be inferred.245 Therefore, it has an inherent vagueness and offences with a strong focus 
on the mens rea are inevitably also quite vague.246 The danger in having broad offences with a 
focus on the mens rea is that mere thoughts become punishable, whereas (in Belgium and many 
other states) the principle is that only acts are punishable.247 Criminalizing mere thoughts 
invades an individual’s private world and fails to treat him or her as a moral agent capable of 
changing their mind.248 Regarding the offence of traveling for example, the Belgian Council of 
State noted that it is situated on the border between the material and the intentional by 
criminalizing an everyday action.249 These broad and vague offences have to be applied 
cautiously because this broadness and vagueness does not sit well with the requirement of the 
legality principle that offences are clearly defined in the law.250 Part of this is due to the 
broadness and vagueness of the actions the Directive requires the Member States to criminalize. 
Belgium, however, chose to go further still, in several cases. By expanding these 
offences, they become even broader and vaguer. For example, Belgium expanded the mens rea 
of the offence of participating in the activities of a terrorist group. This led to convictions for 
sending clothes to siblings or trying to marry.251 The Belgian legislature also created a new 
offence which is not part of the Directive: participating in the making of a decision in the 
context of a terrorist group. This is a poorly worded offence, which encompasses almost 
everybody who has had any relation with the group. When the legislature removed the risk 
requirement, which is present in the Directive, from the incitement offence, the Constitutional 
Court found this a violation of the freedom of expression because the offence was too broad. 
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In that same incitement offence, as well as the recruitment offence, the legislature added the 
traveling offence to the mens rea. Since the traveling offence itself has a broad mens rea, this 
addition makes these offences significantly broader than the ones in the Directive. In addition, 
it creates a strange distinction: inciting or recruiting somebody to travel to another country to 
receive or provide terrorist training there is punishable under Articles 140bis or 140ter CC, 
while inciting or recruiting them to do so in Belgium is not. The Belgian legislature also 
expanded the mens rea of the traveling offence itself compared to the Directive. This causes 
actions that are very far removed from an actual terrorist attack to be punishable. For example: 
inciting somebody to travel in order to recruit somebody to receive training for a terrorist attack 
is an offence under Belgian criminal law.252 Furthermore, with the criminalization of 
preparatory actions, the Belgian legislature created yet another offence with an open-ended, 
broad, and vague actus reus and therefore, a strong reliance on the mens rea. Finally, the 
Belgian legislature created a second prong to the mens rea of the offence of financing a 
terrorist, which is not part of the Directive. This second prong, however, is already 
encompassed by the first prong, only creating unnecessary confusion. 
Due to this broadness and vagueness, there is a fair amount of overlap between many 
of these terrorist offences. For example, a message on social media calling for people to travel 
to Syria could be recruitment, inciting and participation in the travelling offence. Looking up 
certain information online could be self-study and preparation and, if accompanied by other 
actions, perhaps even an attempted terrorist offence stricto sensu. On top of that, if either of 
those things happen within the context of a terrorist group, they also fall under participation in 
the activities of a terrorist group. The Belgian legislature is aware of this, thus Articles 140bis 
to 140sexies CC state that they apply ‘without prejudice to the application of Article 140’.253 
The legislature therefore acknowledged that (some of) the actions being criminalized by these 
articles were already being prosecuted under Article 140 CC. They intended to alleviate all 
doubt about the fact that concurrent offences are possible. The practical application of these 
offences demonstrates that they are very often prosecuted in concurrence with Article 140 
CC.254 Therefore, they have minimal added value. The question also arises regarding the impact 
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of the overlap between Articles 140bis to 140sexies. By only referring to Article 140 CC, the 
legislature has created the possibility for confusion. Under the general rules of Belgian criminal 
law, concurrence between offences is possible without this explicitly being acknowledged in 
the articles containing the individual offences.255 Why then did the legislature explicitly refer 
to Article 140 CC but not to the other terrorist offences? One could think the legislature 
implicitly wanted to exclude concurrence with the other terrorist offences, but that is doubtful 
considering the current climate of extensive criminalization. More likely is that the legislature 
did not have a specific reason for including this clause and for clarity’s sake it should either 
have included all the other articles in this clause or should have deleted it altogether.256 
3. Conclusion 
The Directive has created a wide range of acts to be criminalized by member states 
which Belgium has surpassed abundantly. The Belgian Constitutional Court has also been 
lenient when interpreting these offences. However, despite this lenient case law, the broadness 
and vagueness of many of the offences and the overlap between the different offences are rather 
obvious. 
It is striking that many of the most problematic offences are those where the Belgian 
legislature has surpassed the Directive. Since its entry into force, the offences have only ever 
been expanded. Terrorism has proved to be a difficult issue to address, and the legislature has 
responded by creating more and broader offences. However, many of the issues mentioned 
above could be avoided by doing the opposite: focusing less on the quantity of offences and 
more on the quality. Thoroughly reviewing which behavior should be criminalized and how to 
phrase offences that do so. For Belgium, adhering more closely still to the Directive could be 
a first step towards achieving this goal. For the EU, it could mean looking more critically at 
the broadness of the acts it is requiring member states to criminalize and analyzing how the 
clarity can be improved. Expanding does not always equate to improving. Sometimes less could 
indeed, be more. 
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